组织经济学（Organizational Economics）Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心（CFOS）主办。CFOS的宗旨是，利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题，推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS，请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。

 

时间：2014年3月14日（周五）12：00－13：30

地点：明德主楼729会议室

主讲：席天扬

主题：任人唯贤还是任人唯亲：清朝官僚系统的内部冲突和控制

   摘要： This paper analyzes the mechanism of political control over provincial governors in China

during the Qing dynasty. Belonging to an ethnic minority group, the rulers faced a problem of hiring

competent agents and meanwhile assuring their loyalty. This led to a bureaucratic system combining

the ethnicitybased patronage with meritocracy. Using originally collected data, we find that the

sanction and promotion for governors were highly responsive to internal conflicts within their

jurisdictions. Moreover, new appointments were likely to be drawn from the majority group when

the society was exposed to a high risk of conflicts nationwide. The transformation in the ethnic

composition of the bureaucracy, in turn, reflects the stake of maintaining social stability in times of

peace and crisis. The pattern of bureaucratic control suggests a competence-versus- loyalty

trade-off, which is echoed by the case of contemporary China.

演讲者简介：席天扬，北京大学国家发展研究院助理教授。研究领域包括政治经济学、比较政治学、制度经济学、经济史。2009年毕业于复旦大学经济学院，先后获得经济学学士和硕士学位，2013年获得美国纽约大学政治系政治学博士学位。目前已经在 Journal of Theoretical Politics发表论文。

 

项目协调人：聂辉华

 

  中国人民大学经济学院

 人大企业与组织研究中心

2014年3月11日